Abstract-We study attacks by adversaries which aim to compromise links in a wireless sensor network through various techniques which are modeled using the set-covering problem. We discuss the effects of the attacks and present techniques which can be used to mitigate the effects of the attacks. Furthermore, we analyze the performance of various key predistribution schemes with and without the mitigation techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION The use of large-scale wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in hostile environments requires the development of secure decentralized protocols. The difficulties in developing such protocols lay in the sensor node limitations such as wireless radio range, battery energy, and computational capability. The restrictions on the computational capability of WSN nodes lead to the common assumption that secure protocols can rely only on symmetric key cryptography.
A promising solution for the establishment of symmetric keys in WSN applications is key predistribution, studied in various papers (e.g. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] ). Especially, we focus on the framework presented in [4] that consists of three phases: key assignment, shared-key discovery, and path-key establishment. In a key predistribution scheme (KPS), seeds are distributed to sensor nodes prior to network deployment. After deployment of the WSN, the shared-key discovery phase takes place, where two nodes in wireless communication range determine the existence of shared seeds. If the two nodes share seeds, a link key can be computed as a function of one or more of the shared seeds. The path-key establishment phase takes place if there is no common seed between a pair of nodes in wireless communication range. In this case, the nodes find a path of secure links between them and transfer a key in encrypted form via the path.
The concepts of key predistribution in [4] have also been combined with the key establishment schemes of [1] , [2] based on threshold secret-sharing. In the framework of [10] , each node is assigned a share from each of K polynomials randomly selected from a pool of P bivariate polynomials. Any This work is supported in part by the following grants: Collaborative Technology Alliance (CTA) from ARL, DAAD19-01-2-0011; ONR award, N00014-04-1-0479; ARO grant, W91INF-05-1-0491, and DOD IASP award.
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pair of nodes which contain shares of a common polynomial can compute a unique link key. Once an adversary collects t shares of a polynomial, however, any link key computed using shares of the polynomial are compromised. Shared-key discovery and path-key establishment phases similar to those of [4] can be used with threshold schemes.
The predistributed seeds of a general KPS can take the form of cryptographic keys as in [4] or polynomial shares as in [10] . However, additional results have been proposed which change the way in which link keys are computed from the seeds. For example, in [3] , [5] , [7] , [9] , the shared-key discovery protocols compute a link keys using a cryptographic hash function with seeds as inputs. Regardless of how the seed is used, the shared-key discovery protocol must reveal information pertaining to which seeds are stored in each WSN node in order for neighboring nodes to determine if sufficient seeds are shared to establish a link key. For example, the authors of [4] propose the transmission by each node of the identifiers (IDs) of the seeds contained in the node, noting that this might reveal too much information to an adversary. The authors of [4] further propose the use of a private shared-key discovery protocol based on encryptions of random nonces in order to reduce the amount of information revealed to an adversary. We analyze and discuss these shared-key discovery protocols in Section III. The primary contribution of this paper is presentation, analysis, and discussion of various attacks which can be performed by the adversary using the information revealed during the shared-key discovery protocol. We investigate the impact of various KPS attacks and discuss possible mitigation techniques.
For the purposes of this paper, we assume that the adversary is able to physically capture sensor nodes and access all information stored within the nodes. Furthermore, we assume the adversary is able to eavesdrop and record transmissions throughout the network and determine which WSN node is the sender and receiver of each transmission. We do not consider attacks on network protocols (including node replication, node fabrication, wormhole attacks, etc.) other than those directly involved with the KPS.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses 
A. Recovery of All Seeds
We first consider an adversary interested in recovering all predistributed seeds which exist in the WSN. We consider two possible attacks to achieve this goal: the random capture attack and the seed-cover attack.
Random capture attack: In [4] and several papers that followed (e.g. [5] , [6] , [9] , [10] ), the authors assume that the adversary captures each successive node at random, independent of previously captured nodes. This situation often corresponds to an adversary who physically captures a group of nodes before accessing the information within the sensors nodes.
Seed-cover attack: In [11] , the authors investigate the effect of an adversary able to capture nodes in a sequence using the information recovered from previously capture nodes. We consider the problem in its generality.
The attack is based on the assumption that at each step the adversary can determine the number of uncompromised seeds contained in each uncaptured node and choose to capture the node with the maximum number of uncompromised seeds. The adversary is interested in minimizing the number of nodes which must be captured in order to recover all predistributed seeds. However, this is equivalent to solving the set-covering problem [12] , known to be NP-hard. Hence, we provide an algorithm based on a greedy set-covering heuristic in Fig. 1 , where S(i) is the set of seeds contained in node i, N is the total network size, and C is the set of captured nodes. According to [12] , this greedy algorithm is sub-optimal by at most a factor ln(K) + 1.
KPS schemes which rely on threshold secret-sharing [6] , [10] require a threshold number t of shares of each secret to be compromised before links using the secret can be compromised. Thus, a slight modification must be made to reflect this difference. The algorithm for the seed-cover attack on threshold schemes is given in Fig. 2 . Link-cover attack: The attack is based on the assumption that the adversary can determine the set of seeds used to secure each link in the network and choose to capture the node which will allow the adversary to compromise the maximum number of additional links. We note that this attack is fundamentally different from the seed-cover attack because not all seeds need to be recovered to compromise all of the links in the network. Letting S(i) denote the set of seeds stored in node i, the adversary can construct the collection of sets {S(i) n s(j) i 7 j} \ {0}, where each element represents the set of seeds shared by nodes i and j. The collection of subsets of S(i) represent the possible sets of seeds used to secure links incident to node i. Again, we see that the optimal execution of the link-cover attack is equivalent to solving the set-covering problem [12] and hence is NP-hard. We provide an algorithm based on a greedy set-covering heuristic in Fig. 3 which is suboptimal by at most a factor K ln(2) + 1.
C. Disconnecting the Network
We next consider an adversary interested in capturing a sufficient number of sensor nodes to globally disconnect the WSN. In order to perform such an attack, sufficient information must be available for the adversary to construct the key graph representing all pairs of nodes able to compute 255 Seed-Cover Attack -Threshold t KPS: Random-capture attack: The random-capture attack is equally effective under any shared-key discovery protocol, as the attacker does not take advantage of any of the information revealed by the shared-key discovery protocol. Hence, schemes which are not concerned with attacks other than random capture need not consider any shared-key discovery mechanism other than -the exchange of seed IDs.
The random-capture attack serves as the baseline for comparison in Section V. Under a random-capture attack, the scheme of [4] results in a probability that any link between uncaptured nodes is compromised given that x nodes have been captured given by
Seed-cover attack: The exchange of IDs reveals a significant amount of information to an adversary performing a seedcover attack. However, we now show that the use of a private shared-key discovery protocol reveals just as much information. Under this attack, the first node capture is random because every node has an equal number of uncaptured keys. Once the first node is captured, the adversary can play the role of the captured node in the private neighbor discovery protocol and simply locate the node which shares the smallest number of keys.
Link-cover attack: The exchange of IDs allows for seamless performance of a link-cover attack. However, the use of a private shared-key discovery protocol does not allow the adversary to determine shared-key relationships between nodes until a sufficient number of the keys of each node are already captured. Hence, the adversary is not able to efficiently perform a link-cover attack when a private sharedkey discovery protocol is used.
Disconnection attack: The information obtained during the exchange of IDs allows the adversary to completely reconstruct the key graph and perform a disconnection attack. Since the use of a private shared-key discovery protocol hides the key graph (except compromised links due to captured nodes), the adversary can only attempt to disconnect the network physically by disconnecting the geometric random graph representing physical node communication.
We conclude that a private shared-key discovery protocol is not sufficient to prevent the seed-cover attack. However, since the attacker cannot determine shared-key relationships between uncaptured nodes when the private shared-key discovery protocol is used, the adversary is unable to mount a linkcover or disconnection attack. We further discuss mitigation of the seed-cover attack in the next section.
IV. ATTACK MITIGATION
In this section, we discuss techniques which can be used to mitigate the effect of the seed-cover attack presented in Section II. We discuss the use of private ID However, we observe that even very small number of random node captures could reveal seed IDs for almost every node. If the adversary knows the !CPSa seed which is used to encrypt and exchange /C1PS IDs between a pair of nodes, the adversary obtains seed IDs of IC1PSg for the two nodes. Thus, the adversary is able to recover information from nodes other than those that are physically captures. By capturing x nodes, the adversary is able to recover the AICS3 IDs for the x captured nodes, any physical neighbors of the captured nodes which shared ICPSa seeds, and nodes which are incident to links that are compromised due to the capture of the x nodes. For clarity, this scenario is illustrated in Fig. 4 .
For simplicity, we only focus on the nodes incident with compromised links. Let N denote the total network size and d denote the average number of nodes in the neighborhood of a given node. In addition, let p, denote the probability that any pair of nodes can establish a link key, referred to as the local connectivity, of ICPSa. Hence, the number of edges between nodes within wireless communication range that can establish a link key is approximately e f\dpcx. (2) 2 We look at this problem in detail. An adversary is able to obtain the seed IDs from captured nodes and their neighbors.
Since the number of such neighbors is approximately dpc, the probability that the set of IDs is revealed in this way is about 1-(1_ dN )X, when an adversary captures x random nodes.
As another possibility, an adversary knows the set of IDs if any link that the node used to exchange seed IDs is compromised. Based on the approximation that the link compromises are all independent, the overall probability failid(x) that a node reveals its seed IDs due to x random node captures is estimated as failid(x) 1 I-(1 dp )X + dpa )x NN x (1 (1 fail(x))dPa) 1 -(1 dp,)x(I fai(x))dP_ (3) N where fail(x) is computed over IC'PSa.
We consider an example in which N = 10, 000, d = 40, and pa = 0.5. If by capturing small number of nodes, an adversary is able to compromise 5% of the edges, or 5, 000 edges, the number of nodes incident with those edges might be a significant fraction of the total network size. We note that a node can be incident to multiple edges, so the number of nodes would still be less than N.
With the same parameters as above, suppose 50 node captures compromise 20% of the links between uncaptured nodes. Then we have failid(50) = 0.990, (4) which means the expected fraction of nodes with key identifiers revealed is about 99.0%.
Thus, the strategy that an attacker could take is to capture a small number of nodes at random, reveal the seed IDs for K9PSO for almost every node, and then mount a seed-cover attack. Hence, two or more layered KPSs do not provide additional resilience to a seed-cover attack, and an alternate method is required to mitigate the seed-cover attack.
B. Mitigating a Seed-Cover Attack
In light of the discussion on private shared-key discovery in Section III and the analysis on private ID exchange in Section IV-A, further investigation is needed in order to discover a technique for mitigating a seed-cover attack. We make the following claim, which is proved with a simple logical argument.
Claim 1: Any shared-key discovery protocol of a single KPS such that pairwise keys are determined by the set of common seeds and each node stores a constant number of seeds is susceptible to a seed-cover attack.
Proof: Assume that a shared-key discovery protocol is given, each node contains K out of P seeds, and the adversary has captured one node s. Assume further that the protocol is such that the adversary cannot use the information recovered from s to determine the number of seeds in a node n that are shared with s, i.e. a seed-cover attack cannot be mounted. However, this suggests that s and n were not able to execute a protocol to determine the existence of a shared key before s was captured, and the protocol is not an effective shared-key discovery protocol. a This claim suggests that it may be possible to mitigate a seed-cover attack if we allow K to vary between nodes. Hence, we investigate the effect of allowing nodes to hold varying numbers of seeds using the KPS of [4] for simplicity.
We assume the private shared-key discovery protocol of [4] is being used, so only the seed-cover attack is of interest.
For each node, the key distribution center chooses K uniformly at random such that K1 < K < K2 and assigns a random selection of K keys from a key pool of size P. During the shared-key discovery phase, each node must mask the actual number of seeds it contains by transmitting a.R X (EL, (a)) ,ELK (a), V,I, VK2-K), where each vi is a random nonce and w denotes a random permutation of the given elements. This prevents the adversary from knowing which of the quantities not corresponding to shared keys are unshared keys and which are useless information, thus reducing the effectiveness of the seed-cover attack. Such a scheme can be analyzed by noting that the average Comparision between KPS of [4] and modified KPS for N=10,000 
Example 1: We compare a KPS with P = 28,140 and K 100 to a modified KPS with P = 28,140, K1 = 80, and K2 = 120. The local connectivity, average key storage, and the value of the function fail(x) is thus equivalent for both schemes. Since the modified KPS uses a randomized value of K, the resilience to a seed-cover attack is reduced to that of a random-capture attack, given by (1) . The function fail(x) is plotted for each scheme under random-capture and seed-cover attacks in Fig. 5 .
V. SIMULATIONS
We provide simulation results to demonstrate the effect of the attacks presented in Section II. Furthermore, we provide simulation results corresponding to the mitigation techniques proposed in Section IV.
In Fig. 6 , we simulate fail(x) for a KPS as in [4] where N = 1, 000 nodes are deployed with K = 50 keys each from a key pool of size P = 2,156. We plot the resulting fail(x) versus x for the random-capture, seed-cover, and link-cover attacks assuming that IDs are exchanged in plain text.
In addition to KPSs based on the scheme from [4] , we are interested in schemes based on threshold secret-sharing, such as [6] , [10] , in which links are compromised as soon as the A KPS with a low local connectivity would show a stronger resilience to attacks compared to a KPS of a high local connectivity in the resulting network (with key storage fixed). In return, the establishment of link keys in a neighborhood would require a higher transmission overhead since paths between two nodes would be longer and the number of such paths would be even smaller.
Since a private shared-key discovery protocol (based on the encryptions of random nonces) also requires more computational complexity for encryption/decryption and message overheads (128-256 bits per key), the distribution center should carefully choose whether it takes a KPS with a low local connectivity based on plaintext ID exchange protocol or a KPS with a higher local connectivity based on a private shared-key discovery protocol.
VII. SUMMARY
We have shown that various attacks on key predistribution schemes in WSN can be modeled using the set-covering problem. We present a collection of such attacks which require the adversary to either solve an NP-hard problem or choose a suboptimal solution. We have shown that no protocol requiring a contant number of predistributed seeds for a single KPS system in each node can be secure against the seed-cover attack. In order to mitigate the effects of a seed-cover attack, we proposed the randomization of the number of seeds K stored in each node.
APPENDIX
The function fail(x) for a seed-cover attack on the KPS of [4] can be expressed recursively as fail(x) = fail(x -1) + (1 -fail(x -1)) q(x) (7) where q(x) is the probability that a link which was uncompromised after (x-1) nodes were captured is compromised when the xth node is captured. Given that fail(O) -0, the closed-form solution for fail(x) is given by 
The probability q(x) is a function of the number of seeds
Mx-1 contained in the (x -1) previously captured nodes and the maximum number of uncaptured keys kmax,x contained in one of the remaining nodes, both of which are random variables. Given Mx-l 1 m and kmax,x = k, the probability that a given uncaptured seed is captured in the xth node is km. Hence, the probability q(x) is thus given by (1 1) where c2 is a normalizing constant to ensure the probability sums to 1 over all values of m. The given equations can then be combined to yield an expression for fail(x) for a seed-cover attack on the KPS of [4] .
